Can engineering neural networks be approached in a disciplined way similar to how engineers build software for civil aircraft? We present nn-dependability-kit, an opensource toolbox to support safety engineering of neural networks for autonomous driving systems. The rationale behind nndependability-kit is to consider a structured approach (via Goal Structuring Notation) to argue the quality of neural networks. In particular, the tool realizes recent scientific results including (a) novel dependability metrics for indicating sufficient elimination of uncertainties in the product life cycle, (b) formal reasoning engine for ensuring that the generalization does not lead to undesired behaviors, and (c) runtime monitoring for reasoning whether a decision of a neural network in operation is supported by prior similarities in the training data. A proprietary version of nndependability-kit has been used to improve the quality of a level-3 autonomous driving component developed by Audi for highway maneuvers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, neural networks have been widely adopted in engineering automated driving systems with examples in perception, decision making, or even end-to-end scenarios. As these systems are safety-critical in nature, problems during operation such as failed identification of pedestrians may contribute to risky behaviors. Importantly, the root cause of these undesired behaviors can be independent of hardware faults or software programming errors but can solely reside in the data-driven engineering process, e.g., unexpected results of function extrapolation between correctly classified training data.
In this paper, we present nn-dependability-kit, an opensource toolbox to support data-driven engineering of neural networks for safety-critical domains. The goal is to provide evidence of uncertainty reduction in key phases of the product life cycle, ranging from data collection, training & validation, testing & generalization, to operation. nn-dependability-kit is built upon our previous research work [2] - [6] , where (a) novel dependability metrics [3] , [5] are introduced to indicate uncertainties being reduced in the engineering life cycle, (b) formal reasoning engine [2] , [6] is used to ensure that the generalization does not lead to undesired behaviors, and (c) runtime neuron activation pattern monitoring [4] is applied to reason whether a decision of a neural network in operation time is supported by prior similarities in the training data.
Concerning related work, our results [2] - [6] are within recent research efforts from the software engineering and formal methods community targeting to provide provable guarantee over neural networks [6] , [9] - [11] , [15] , [16] , [18] , [21] , [28] , [30] , [37] , [38] or to test neural networks [3] , [12] , [17] , [23] , [26] , [27] , [33] , [34] . The static analysis engine inside nn-dependability-kit for formally analyzing neural networks, as introduced in our work in 2017 [6] as a pre-processing step before exact constraint solving, has been further extended to support the octagon abstract domain [25] in addition to using the interval domain. One deficiency of the abovementioned works is how to connect safety goals or uncertainty identification [14] , [20] , [31] to concrete evidences required in the safety engineering process. This gap is tightened by our earlier work of dependability metrics [5] being partly integrated inside nn-dependability-kit. Lastly, our runtime monitoring technique [4] is different from known results that either use additional semantic embedding (and integrate it in the loss function) for computing difference measures [24] or use Monte-Carlo dropout [13] as ensembles: our approach provides a sound guarantee of the similarity measure based on the neuron word distance to the training data.
In terms of practicality, a proprietary version of nndependability-kit has been successfully used to understand the quality of a level-3 autonomous highway maneuvering component developed by Audi. Figure 1 provides a simplified Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [19] diagram to assist in understanding how features provided by nn-dependability-kit contribute to the overall safety goal 1 . Our proposed metrics, unless explicitly specified, are based on extensions of our early work [5] . Starting with the goal of having a neural network to function correctly (G1), based on assumptions where no software and hardware fault appears (A1, A2), the strategy (S1) is to ensure that within different phases of the product life cycle, correctness is ensured. These phases include data preparation (G2), training and validation (G3), testing and generalization (G4), and operation (G5).
II. FEATURES AND CONNECTIONS TO SAFETY CASES

(Data preparation) Data preparation includes data collection
and labeling. Apart from correctly labeling the data (G6), one needs to ensure that the collected data covers all operating scenarios (G7). An artificial example of violating such a principle is to only collect data in sunny weather, while the vehicle is also expected to be operated in snowy weather. Quantitative projection coverage metric [3] and its associated test case generation techniques (Sn1, Sn2), based on the concept of combinatorial testing [7] , [22] , are used to provide a relative form of completeness against the combinatorial explosion of scenarios. (Training and validation) Currently, the goal of training correctness is refined into two subgoals of understanding the decision of the neural network (G10) and correctness rate (G8), which is further refined by considering the performance under different operating scenarios (G9). Under the assumption where the neural network is used for vision-based object detection (A5), metrics such as interpretation precision (Sn5) and sensitivity of occlusion (Sn6) are provided by nn-dependability-kit. (Testing and generalization) Apart from classical performance measures (Sn7), we also test the generalization subject to known perturbations such as haze or Gaussian noise (G11) using the perturbation loss metric (Sn8).
Provided that domain knowledge can be formally specified (A3), one can also apply formal verification (Sn9) to examine if the neural network demonstrates correct behavior with respect to the specification (G12). (Operation) In operation time, as the ground truth is no longer available, a dependable system shall raise warnings when a decision of the neural network is not supported by prior similarities in training (S3). nn-dependability- kit provides runtime monitoring (Sn10) [4] by first using binary decision diagrams (BDD) [1] to record binarized neuron activation patterns in training time, followed by checking if an activation pattern produced during operation is contained in the BDD.
III. USING NN-DEPENDABILITY-KIT
In this section, we highlight the usage of nn-dependabilitykit with three examples; interested readers can download these examples as jupyter notebooks from the tool website. a) Systematic data collection for training and testing: The first example is related to the completeness of the data used in testing autonomous driving components. The background is that one wishes to establish a coverage-driven data collection process where data diversity is approached in a disciplined manner. This is in contrast to unsystematic approaches such as merely driving as many kilometers as possible; the visited scenarios under unsystematic approaches may be highly repetitive.
Here for simplicity, we only consider five discrete categories to evaluate the diversity of the collected data. With discrete categorization, images or videos sharing the same semantic attributes fall into the same equivalence class. It is immediate that the number of equivalence classes is exponential to number of discrete categories (in this example, the number of equivalence classes equals 3×2×2×3×2 = 72). Figure 2 provides 6 images taken from the German A9 highway (near Munich Schwabing); each of them is an instance of a particular equivalence class. With 6 images, the coverage by considering covering every equivalence class with one image or video is only 6 72 = 8.3%. For pragmatic situations, the number of discrete categories can easily reach 40, making the minimum number of test cases to achieve full coverage be thousands of billions (2 40 ).
In nn-dependability-kit, the scenario k-projection coverage tries to create a rational yet relatively complete coverage criteria that avoids the above mentioned combinatorial explosion (rational -possible to achieve 100%) while still guaranteeing diversity of test data (relatively complete). For example, when setting k = 2, the 2-projection coverage claims 100% coverage so long as the collected data is able to cover arbitrary pairs of conditions from two different categories. In this example, the collected data should cover every pair (c i , c j ) where i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, i = j, c i ∈ C i and c j ∈ C j . This makes the number of test cases to achieve full coverage be quadratic (when k = 2) to the number of categories.
nn-dependability-kit reports that a data set using 6 images in Figure 2 achieves a 2-projection coverage of 32 57 . In addition, the solver automatically suggests to include (cloudy, night, inner, right bending, dry) as the next image or video to be collected; the suggested case can maximally increase the coverage by 7 57 . The denominator 57 comes from the following computation i<j,i,j∈{1,2,3,4,5} |C i |×|C j |. One may additionally include constraints to describe unreasonable cases that cannot be found in reality. For example, constraints such as 0 ≤ C1.sunny + C2.night ≤ 1 prohibits the solver to consider proposals where the image is taken at night (C2.night = 1) but the weather is sunny (C1.sunny = 1). b) Formal verification of a highway front car selection network: The second example is to formally verify properties of a neural network that selects the target vehicle for an adaptive cruise control (ACC) system to follow. The overall pipeline is illustrated in Figure 3 , where two modules use images of a front facing camera of a vehicle to (i) detect other vehicles as bounding boxes (vehicle detection via YOLO [29] ) and (ii) identify the ego-lane boundaries (ego-lane detection). Outputs of these two modules are fed into the third module called target vehicle selection, which is as a neural-network based classifier that reports either the index of the bounding box where the target vehicle is located, or a special class for "no target vehicle".
As the target vehicle selection neural network takes a fixed number of bounding boxes, one undesired situation of the neural network appears when the network outputs the existence of a target vehicle with index i, but the corresponding ith input does not contain a vehicle bounding box (marked with "E" in Figure 3 ). For the snapshot in Figure 3 , the neural network should not output box 9 or 10 as there are only 8 vehicle bounding boxes. The below code snippet shows how to verify if the unwanted behavior happens in a neural network (net). The undesired property is encoded into two sets of linear constraints, the inputConstraints denotes box 9 and 10 do not exist and the riskProperty denotes the neural network selects box 9 or 10 as the final result. The verify() function verifies whether if there exists an input that is contained in the specified minimum and maximum bound (inputMinBound, inputMaxBound) while satisfying inputConstraints, but feeding the input to the neural network produces an output that satisfies riskProperty. import staticanalysis as sa ... sa.verify(inputMinBound, inputMaxBound, net, inputConstraints, riskProperty) c) Perturbation Loss over German Traffic Sign Recognition Network: The last example is to analyze a neural network trained under the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark [32] with the goal of classifying various traffic signs. With nn-dependability-kit, one can apply the perturbation loss metric using the below code snippet, in order to understand the robustness of the network subject to known perturbations.
import PerturbationLoss as pbl m = pbl.Perturbation_Loss_Metric() ... m.addInputs(net, image, label) ... m.printMetricQuantity("AVERAGE_LOSS")
As shown in the center of Figure 4 -a, the original image of "end of no overtaking zone" is perturbed by nndependability-kit using seven methods. The application of Gaussian noise changes the result of classification, where the confidence of being "end of no overtaking zone" has dropped 83.4% (from the originally identified 100% to 16.6%). When applying perturbation systematically over the complete data set, the result is summarized in Figure 4 -b, where one concludes that the network is robust against haze and fog (the maximum probability reduction is close to 0%) but should be improved against FGSM attacks [35] and snow.
IV. OUTLOOK
The journey of nn-dependability-kit originates from an urgent need in creating a rigorous approach for engineering learning-enabled autonomous driving systems. We conclude this paper by highlighting some of our ongoing activities: (i) Transfer the developed safety concept to related standardization communities (e.g., ISO/PAS 21448), including the use of GSN for ML safety argument, as well as the use of formal methods for quality assurance. (ii) Investigate how assume-guarantee reasoning techniques can make formal verification scalable. (iii) Extend recent results in safe perturbation bounds [8] , [36] , [38] , [39] to support decisions beyond classification.
